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INTRODUCTION

Consider the following situation: Dick and Jane are in a
domestic relationship. During a heated argument, Dick strikes
Jane several times, hits her with a broken beer bottle, and threatens
to kill her if she calls the police. Jane calls the police anyway, and
Dick is arrested. The county attorney could charge Dick with
several crimes: second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon (the
1
2
beer bottle), terroristic threats (based upon the verbal threat),
3
and/or domestic assault. One prosecutor might focus the charges
on the most serious crime. Another might want to “throw the book
at him” and file every charge supported by the evidence. But no
matter how many crimes the prosecutor charges, the defendant will
probably only be sentenced on the most serious crime for which he
is convicted.
This is the result of Minnesota Statutes section 609.035. Since
its introduction as part of the Criminal Code of 1963, section
609.035 has provided that a district court may impose only a single
sentence for multiple crimes committed by a criminal defendant
during a single behavioral incident. The theory behind the statute
is simple: punishment for the most serious crime committed during
a single behavioral incident incorporates punishment for all of the
less-serious crimes committed during the same behavioral incident.
Application of the statute not only keeps sentences rational and
proportional to a defendant’s conduct but also reduces the
incentive for prosecutors to over-charge cases. This is true because
in most cases adding duplicative charges will not change the
defendant’s total sentence.
What if, however, during Dick and Jane’s argument, their
neighbor Sally came over to see what was wrong? After Dick hit
Jane with the bottle, he turned to Sally and punched her in the
face, knocking out one of her teeth. In addition to the charges
involving Jane, a prosecutor could charge Dick with first-degree
4
assault for his actions against Sally. But under the plain language
1. See MINN. STAT. § 609.222, subdiv. 2 (2012).
2. See id. § 609.713, subdiv. 1.
3. See id. § 609.2242.
4. See id. § 609.221, subdiv. 1. The loss of a tooth is ordinarily, but not
necessarily, sufficient evidence of “great bodily harm,” which is required for
conviction under section 609.221, subdivision 1. See State v. Moore, 699 N.W.2d
733, 736–37 (Minn. 2005); State v. Bridgeforth, 357 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984).
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and rationale of section 609.035, the court could not sentence Dick
for assaulting Sally because that crime was committed during the
same behavioral incident as a more serious crime: the seconddegree assault of Jane.
Almost forty years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the second scenario described above required a different
result than the one mandated by the plain language of section
609.035. Thus was born the “multiple-victim exception” to section
609.035. Where a defendant commits crimes during a single
behavioral incident against multiple victims, a court may impose
multiple sentences of up to one sentence per victim. Although the
statute contained no such exception, the court held that the
legislature did not intend to prevent the imposition of multiple
sentences in such cases.
The court later added a caveat to the multiple-victim
exception: the total sentence imposed under the exception must
5
not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.
The purpose of this caveat was to maintain in multiple-victim cases
some consideration of the proportionality of the sentence to the
6
defendant’s conduct.
The multiple-victim exception, as it currently exists, is
problematic in several respects. By allowing a court to impose
without limit one sentence per behavioral incident per victim, the
exception encourages the kind of over-charging and chargebargaining that section 609.035 was designed to prevent. This is
especially true in cases involving a multitude of victims. More
fundamentally, the exception is problematic because it was created
by the court, rather than the legislature, and results from a rather
dubious piece of statutory interpretation. Because the exception is
not moored to the language of a statute, it remains subject to
change on a case-by-case basis. Recently, the court expanded the
exception to, for the first time, affirm the imposition of more than
one sentence per victim and, in the same case, dramatically altered
how a district court is to determine for which offense to impose a
7
sentence. In addition, the “fail-safe” provision of the exception—
5. See, e.g., State v. Rieck, 286 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Minn. 1979).
6. See State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 606 n.6 (Minn. 2009) (using
“unfairly exaggerate” standard to refute suggestion that multiple-victim exception
“d[id] not incorporate notions of proportionality”).
7. State v. Ferguson, 808 N.W.2d 586, 589–92 (Minn. 2012). The author of
this article represented Michael Ferguson in the appeals of his convictions and
sentences.
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that the total sentence imposed does not unfairly exaggerate the
criminality of the defendant’s conduct—is not much of a fail-safe at
all. It is amorphous, difficult to apply, and leads to inconsistent
results.
This article proposes that the legislature should amend section
609.035 to address the problems with the court-created version of
the multiple-victim exception. First, the legislature should amend
the statute to allow for the imposition of multiple sentences in
cases involving crimes committed against multiple victims. Second,
in keeping with Minnesota’s goal of maintaining a rational,
proportional sentencing system, the legislature should limit the
district court to imposing no more than two sentences per
behavioral incident. Third, the legislature should codify Minnesota
Supreme Court case law holding that the court can only impose a
sentence for the most serious offense committed per victim—using
comparison of the statutory maximum sentences and the offense’s
severity-level rankings under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
to determine which of several offenses is most serious. These
changes will ensure that Minnesota’s sentencing system is applied
consistently and even-handedly and that criminal defendants
receive sentences commensurate with their culpability.
II. SECTION 609.035 AND THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION
Minnesota Statutes section 609.035 provides in pertinent part
that “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one offense
under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only
8
one of the offenses.” The statute prohibits the imposition of
multiple sentences for multiple crimes committed during a single
9
behavioral incident. The purpose of section 609.035 is to limit
punishment for multiple crimes “to the maximum punishment for
10
the most serious offense.”
In an early case interpreting the statute, the Minnesota
8. § 609.035, subdiv. 1.
9. See State v. Scott, 298 N.W.2d 67, 68 (Minn. 1980). The statutory phrase
“a person’s conduct” refers to a “single behavioral incident.” See State v. Johnson,
273 Minn. 394, 402–04, 141 N.W.2d 517, 523–24 (1966). Intentional crimes are
committed during a single behavioral incident when they share a unity of time,
place, and criminal objective. State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn.
1995).
10. Johnson, 273 Minn. at 399, 141 N.W.2d at 522; see also id. at 399–400, 141
N.W.2d at 521–22 (discussing Maynard E. Pirsig’s commentary on Minnesota
Statutes section 609.035).
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Supreme Court explained its purpose: “to insure that punishment
for a single incident of criminal behavior involving a multiplicity of
violations will be commensurate with the criminality of defendant’s
11
misconduct.” The drafters thought that the best way to ensure
that punishment was commensurate with conduct was to limit
12
punishment to just one crime per behavioral incident. This was
true, the drafters thought, because “as a practical matter a single
sentence will necessarily take into account all violations, and
imposing up to the maximum punishment for the most serious
13
offense will include punishment for all offenses.” The drafters
were concerned that “permitting a series of prosecutions and
sentences where a single behavioral incident constitutes more than
one offense will ‘exaggerate the criminality of the behavior
involved and, in a sense, defeat the policy underlying the
14
constitutional protection against double jeopardy.’”
This
legislative history shows that the single-sentence rule is not some
accident of history or unintended consequence of another policy.
Instead, the prohibition against multiple sentences was a wellthought-out and rational policy decision by the legislature.
Under section 609.035, a court may impose a sentence for only
the most serious offense committed during a single behavioral
incident. In order to determine which of several offenses is most
serious, courts should compare the actual sentences which would
be imposed for different offenses, the severity-level rankings for
those offenses under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, and
15
the statutory maximum sentences. If those factors are identical,
or if the crimes at issue are non-felonies, the court may consider
“the nature of the offenses to determine which offense is the most
16
serious.” Using this method, a court imposing a single sentence
11. Id. at 399, 141 N.W.2d at 521–22.
12. Id. at 399, 141 N.W.2d at 522.
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 Maynard E. Pirsig cmt. (1965)).
In addition to prohibiting multiple sentences, section 609.035 prohibits serialized
prosecutions by requiring that all crimes arising from a single behavioral incident
are charged in a single complaint and provides broader double-jeopardy
protections than those afforded by federal law. MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subdiv. 1
(2012); Johnson, 273 Minn. at 399–400, 141 N.W.2d at 522.
15. See State v. Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2006). Curiously, it was
not until 2006 that the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly detailed how a court
should determine which of several crimes committed during a behavioral incident
was the most serious. Id. at 323.
16. Id. at 323. For example, the defendant in Kebaso was convicted of gross-
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can be sure that it is punishing the defendant for the worst of his or
her conduct and, therefore, punishing the defendant for all of his
17
or her criminal conduct.
The number of sentences imposed has significant practical
consequences both for the total sentence imposed in a particular
case and for subsequent cases. In many cases, multiple sentences
18
can often be consecutive to one another. An offender who has to
serve two sentences consecutive to one another will almost always
be in prison longer than an offender who does not.
Even if the multiple sentences are to be served concurrent with
one another, the imposition of multiple sentences can affect the
19
total sentence. Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, a
defendant’s presumptive sentence is determined by comparing on
a grid the defendant’s criminal-history score with the severity level
20
of the to-be-sentenced offense. The criminal-history score is made
up of one point or half-point for each felony offense that has been
misdemeanor domestic assault and gross-misdemeanor interference with a 911
call. Id. at 320. The offenses occurred during a single behavioral incident. Id.
The crimes had the same statutory maximum sentences and, because they were
not felonies, were not ranked in the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 321 n.4.
Considering the nature of the offenses, the supreme court affirmed the court of
appeals’ holding that domestic assault was more serious than interference with a
911 call because domestic assault is a crime against a person rather than against
the administration of justice. Id. at 323. The court also considered the fact that,
under the facts of the case, domestic assault was the primary crime and the
interference crime was incidental to the domestic assault. Id. Finally, the court
held that the lower courts could not consider the possible immigration
consequences of the two crimes when deciding which is more serious. Id.
17. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 Maynard E. Pirsig cmt. (2009).
18. Consecutive sentences are sentences to be served one after the other.
MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1.B.3 (2012). Depending on the types of offenses
involved and the circumstances thereof, consecutive sentencing is either
presumptive (that is, required unless the court departs from the presumptive
sentence), permissive (may be imposed, or not imposed, without a departure), or
would require a departure from the presumptive sentence. Id. § 2.F .
19. Section 609.035 in most cases precludes the imposition of multiple
concurrent sentences for crimes committed during a single behavioral incident.
See State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. 1995).
20. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2; see also Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d
584, 586–87 (Minn. 2003) (describing Minnesota’s determinate-sentencing system
and sentencing-guidelines grid). Minnesota’s sentencing-guidelines system was
“the dominant model for the creation of guidelines in other states and for the
federal system as well.” Brian Forst, Managing Miscarriages of Justice from
Victimization to Reintegration, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1209, 1263 (2010–11). The purpose of
the Guidelines “is to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards that . . .
are proportional to the severity of the conviction offense and the offender’s
criminal history.” MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1.A.
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sentenced at the time of the sentencing on the instant offense. In
many situations, a court can use one of a defendant’s convictions
and sentences from a single behavioral incident to increase his or
her criminal-history score for a second conviction and sentence
22
arising from the same incident. This sentencing practice is known
as the Hernandez method and leads to increased sentences because
the increased criminal-history score leads to an increased
23
presumptive sentence.
When the criminal-history score is
increased, the end-result presumptive sentence is likewise
increased.
As an example of the practical effect of the multiple-victim
24
exception, consider State v. Patterson. Patterson was convicted of
aiding and advising the drive-by shooting of T.D. and aiding and
25
advising the second-degree murder of R.A. The crimes occurred
26
during a single behavioral incident.
The multiple-victim
exception allowed the district court to sentence him for both
27
Using Patterson’s criminal-history score of zero, the
crimes.
presumptive sentences for the offenses were forty-eight months in
28
prison and 306 months in prison, respectively. The district court,
however, used the Hernandez method to increase Patterson’s
21. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.B.
22. See, e.g., State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Minn. 1983).
23. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES §§ 1.B.9, 2.B.1.e. Under the method of
sentencing first affirmed in State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. 1981),
“when a defendant is sentenced for multiple offenses on the same day, a
conviction for which the defendant is first sentenced is added to his or her
criminal-history score for another offense for which he or she is also sentenced.”
State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 521 (Minn. 2009). Court opinions often use
the terms “Hernandize” or “Hernandez method” to describe this form of sentencing.
See id. at 521–22 (citing State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 302–03 (Minn. 1997)). The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines do the same. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 1.B.9. The Sentencing Guidelines prohibit the use of the Hernandez method
when imposing multiple sentences for certain drug crimes, burglary and crimes
committed during a burglary, and kidnapping and crimes committed during a
kidnapping. See Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 522–23; MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 2.B.1.e(1).
24. 796 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d, State v. Patterson, 812
N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 2012). The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Patterson
was properly sentenced. Patterson, 796 N.W.2d at 532. The Minnesota Supreme
Court granted review of the case only to address one of Patterson’s challenges to
his conviction, and it affirmed the court of appeals on that point. Patterson, 812
N.W.2d at 108.
25. Patterson, 796 N.W.2d at 522.
26. Id. at 532–33.
27. Id. at 531–32.
28. Id. at 532.
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criminal-history score from zero to one before sentencing Patterson
29
This, in turn, increased Patterson’s
for the murder of R.A.
30
sentence from 306 months to 326 months in prison. Applying
both the multiple-victim exception and the Hernandez sentencing
method not only caused Patterson to receive two sentences for
31
crimes committed during a single behavioral incident, but it
32
increased the length of his total sentence by twenty months.
Even if the imposition of multiple sentences does not increase
the total sentence for a defendant in the case at bar, multiple
sentences will adversely affect the defendant’s criminal-history
score in subsequent cases. For example, the imposition of
concurrent sentences for two misdemeanor assaults might not
affect the defendant’s total sentence in that case because nonfelony sentences cannot be Hernandized and probationary and jail
33
time is capped by statute.
But in any subsequent cases, the
sentences will result in the defendant receiving two misdemeanor
units instead of one, which will get him or her that much closer to
the four such units required to add a point to the criminal-history
34
score.
Section 609.035 also helps achieve consistent and rational
results in charging practices. A person’s criminal behavior during a
single behavioral incident might support one or multiple criminal
charges. Only the prosecutor can decide which and how many
35
charges to level in a particular case.
If a defendant could be
sentenced for every crime he or she committed during a single
behavioral incident, then the prosecutor could determine the final
sentence by deciding how many crimes to charge because a
defendant’s total sentence could increase with each conviction. In
order to achieve the longest possible sentence, a prosecutor might
be tempted to file duplicative charges—convictions of which would
add nothing of value to evaluating a defendant’s culpability but
could dramatically increase the presumptive sentence. A different
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 531–32.
32. Id. at 532.
33. See MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 3–4 (2012) (defining misdemeanor as a
crime punishable by no more than ninety days in jail and gross misdemeanor as a
crime punishable by no more than 365 days in jail); id. § 609.135, subdiv. 2
(providing for maximum probationary terms for misdemeanor and grossmisdemeanor offenses).
34. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.B(3) (2012).
35. See State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Minn. 1996).
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prosecutor, on the other hand, might charge the defendant with
only the most serious crime committed during the behavioral
incident under the theory that punishing the defendant for that
crime will encompass punishment for all other less-serious crimes
committed during the same behavioral incident. Because section
609.035 normally allows only one sentence per behavioral incident,
prosecutors have little incentive to file duplicative charges because
36
such charges cannot lead to longer sentences. Section 609.035
does not limit or interfere with a prosecutor’s charging options; a
prosecutor may charge however many offenses probable cause
supports. But under section 609.035, the practical effect of such
charging decisions is limited to punishing the defendant for only
the most serious offense committed during a single behavioral
incident under the entirely rational theory that such punishment
37
will fully account for his or her criminal behavior.
III. THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION
A.

The Judicial Creation of the Multiple-Victim Exception

The plain language of section 609.035 created a bright-line
rule: one sentence per behavioral incident. However, from the day
it enacted the statute, the legislature carved out exceptions to this
rule. When it was enacted in 1963, section 609.035 contained a
burglary exception to its prohibition on multiple sentences for
38
crimes committed during a single behavioral incident. That is,
36. If a defendant commits multiple offenses during different behavioral
incidents, a prosecutor may charge and convict a defendant for each of them, and
the court may properly use each conviction to obtain a longer total sentence. See,
e.g., State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 304–05 (Minn. 1997) (affirming multiple
Hernandez-method sentences for defendant who committed several drug-sale
offenses on different days and during different behavioral incidents). This result
violates neither section 609.035 nor the policies behind the statute because the
crimes at issue were committed during different behavioral incidents rather than
during a single course of conduct.
37. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 advisory comm. cmt. (West, Westlaw
through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
38. Act of May 17, 1963, ch. 753, art. I, § 609.035, 1963 Minn. Laws 1188
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subdiv. 1 (2012)). The original
text of the statute read:
Except as provided in section 609.585, if a person’s conduct constitutes
more than one offense under the laws of this state he may be punished
for only one of such offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of
them is a bar to prosecution for any other of them. All such offenses may
be included in one prosecution which shall be stated in separate counts.
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the statute permitted punishment for a crime committed during
39
the course of a burglary in addition to the burglary sentence itself.
The legislature has amended section 609.035 throughout the past
fifty years to provide several additional exceptions permitting
40
multiple convictions arising out of a single behavioral incident.
These include exceptions for crimes involving ineligible people
41
possessing firearms, crimes committed while fleeing a peace
42
officer, criminal sexual conduct crimes committed with force or
43
44
violence, and arson.
The legislature also created chargingstatute exceptions to section 609.035, permitting a court to impose
45
sentences for offenses arising out of a single behavioral incident.
46
These include exceptions for kidnapping, certain crimes against
47
unborn children, crimes while wearing or possessing a bullet48
49
resistant vest, crimes involving the solicitation of juveniles,
50
crimes involving the use of police radios, and certain driving51
while-intoxicated offenses.
These exceptions reveal that the legislature is well aware of
Id. Section 609.585 allows a court to convict and sentence a defendant for
burglary and for any crime committed during the burglary. See id. § 609.585, 1963
Minn. Laws 1222 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.585 (2012)).
39. Id. § 609.585, 1963 Minn. Laws 1222 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT.
§ 609.585 (2012)).
40. See State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 2009).
41. Act of Mar. 29, 1996, ch. 408, art. 4, § 3, subdiv. 3, 1996 Minn. Laws 654
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subdiv. 3 (2012)).
42. Act of May 21, 1999, ch. 216, art. 3, § 6, subdiv. 5, 1999 Minn. Laws 1314
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subdiv. 5 (2012)).
43. Act of Mar. 30, 2000, ch. 311, art. 4, § 1, subdiv. 6, 2000 Minn. Laws 211
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subdiv. 6 (2012)).
44. Act of May 27, 1997, ch. 239, art. 8, § 29, subdiv. 4, 1997 Minn. Laws 2866
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subdiv. 4 (2012)).
45. See Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 520.
46. Act of May 12, 1983, ch. 139, § 2, 1983 Minn. Laws 378 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.251 (2012)).
47. Act of Mar. 21, 1986, ch. 388, §§ 3–14, 1986 Minn. Laws 346–50 (codified
as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.21, subdiv. 3–4 (repealed 2007); codified at
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.266–.2665, .267–.2672, .268 (2012)).
48. Act of April 16, 1990, ch. 439, § 1, 1990 Minn. Laws 904 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 609.486 (2012)).
49. Act of May 20, 1993, ch. 326, art. 4, § 24, 1993 Minn. Laws 2036–37
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.494 (2012)).
50. Act of May 14, 1987, ch. 111, § 2, 1987 Minn. Laws 236 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 609.856 (2012)).
51. Act of May 10, 1994, ch. 615, § 23, 1994 Minn. Laws 1380, 1393–1396
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.035 subdiv. 2(a), (f) (1998), amended by
Act of Mar. 30, 2000, ch. 478, art. 2, § 4, 2000 Minn. Laws 1531 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subdiv. 2(a), (e) (2012))).
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how to make policy decisions that, in certain situations, warrant
multiple sentences for multiple crimes committed during a single
behavioral incident. The legislature has never made such a
decision regarding crimes against multiple victims committed
during a single behavioral incident. Instead, the Minnesota
Supreme Court “created” that exception to the plain language of
52
section 609.035. The decision leading to that creation presents a
53
classic case of bad facts making at least questionable law.
Philip Stangvik suffered from mental-health problems and
54
delusions. Among other things, he thought his wife was trying to
55
Stangvik had a history of
kill him by poisoning his food.
committing violent acts against his wife and children and, as a
result, had been committed to and discharged from several mental
56
institutions. In 1963, Stangvik was a patient at the Fergus Falls
57
State Hospital. In May of that year, he was granted a series of
58
three-day provisional discharges so he could visit his parents.
During one such discharge, Stangvik stabbed to death his wife and
59
two children.
As part of a plea agreement, Stangvik pleaded guilty to first60
degree murder for killing his wife and to two counts of second61
degree murder relating to the death of each of his children. The
district court imposed three sentences: life in prison for the firstdegree count and concurrent sentences of forty years in prison for
62
each of the second-degree counts.
On appeal, Stangvik argued, among other things, that the
imposition of multiple sentences violated the then newly enacted
63
section 609.035. His argument seemed to have merit given that
52. The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the multiplevictim exception as being “court-created.” See State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881,
883 (Minn. 1983); State v. McAdoo, 330 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Minn. 1983); State v.
Wallace, 327 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Minn. 1982).
53. See State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353, 161 N.W.2d 667
(1968).
54. Id. at 355, 161 N.W.2d at 669.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 354–55, 161 N.W.2d at 669.
57. Id. at 354, 161 N.W.2d at 669.
58. Id. at 355, 161 N.W.2d at 669.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 356–57, 161 N.W.2d at 670.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 357, 161 N.W.2d at 670.
63. Id. at 359, 161 N.W.2d at 671. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
section 609.035 applied to Stangvik’s case even though it had not been enacted at
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the district court imposed three sentences for crimes clearly
committed during a single behavioral incident—a fact the
64
Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged. Nonetheless, the court
65
affirmed the imposition of multiple sentences.
The court based its holding on two grounds. Primarily, the
court concluded that when it enacted section 609.035, “the
legislature did not intend in every case to immunize offenders from
the consequences of separate crimes intentionally committed in a
66
single episode against more than one individual.” The court did
not cite any legislative history to support its conclusion but rather
relied upon a series of cases in which the California Supreme Court
67
interpreted California’s single-sentence statute in a similar way.
Essentially, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the policy
behind the single-sentence rule of section 609.035—that a sentence
for the most serious crime will encompass sentencing for all other

the time of his offense. Id. at 359–60, 161 N.W.2d at 671–72.
64. Id. at 361, 161 N.W.2d at 673. Notwithstanding this acknowledgement,
the court went on to hold that “from a legal point of view [the murders] were
totally unrelated.” Id. The court did not explain how the three offenses
committed during a single behavioral incident—until that time, the only “legal
point of view” that mattered— were “totally unrelated.”
65. Id.
66. Id. at 360, 161 N.W.2d at 672. The court cited six decisions in support of
this proposition, but none of those cases involved the imposition of multiple
sentences for crimes committed during a single behavioral incident. Id. (citing
State v. Gaulke, 281 Minn. 327, 161 N.W.2d 662 (1968); State v. Murphy, 277
Minn. 355, 152 N.W.2d 507 (1967); State v. Gladden, 274 Minn. 533, 144 N.W.2d
779 (1966); State v. Reiland, 274 Minn. 121, 124, 142 N.W.2d 635, 638 (1966);
State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 405, 141 N.W.2d 517, 525 (1966); City of
Bloomington v. Kossow, 269 Minn. 467, 131 N.W.2d 206 (1964)). The court
acknowledged that it had never considered the question presented in Stangvik. See
id. at 359–60, 161 N.W.2d at 672.
67. Id. at 360, 161 N.W.2d at 672 (citing People v. Ridley, 408 P.2d 124 (Cal.
1965); Neal v. State, 357 P.2d 839 (Cal. 1961)). The California statute provided
that “an act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this code may be punishable under either of such provisions, but in
no case can it be punished under more than one.” Neal, 357 P.2d at 843 (citing
CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (1872)). In Neal, the California Supreme Court held that
the California statute prohibited sentencing a defendant more than once for
violating more than one provision of the same statute. Id. at 844. However,
notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, the court also held that a
defendant who commits crimes against multiple victims may receive more than
one sentence because such a defendant is more culpable than is a person who
commits multiple offenses against a single individual. Id. In 2012, the California
Supreme Court reversed the portion of Neal which held that a court could not
impose sentences for violations of different parts of the same statute. People v.
Correa, 278 P.3d 809 (Cal. 2012).
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crimes committed during the behavioral incident—did not hold
68
true in cases involving multiple victims.
The court also noted a second rationale for its decision: that
the imposition of multiple sentences in Stangvik’s case “does not
69
offend our sense of justice.”
The court held that when
considering the propriety of multiple sentences under section
609.035, “much . . . depend[s] on the harm inflicted and whether
multiple sentences would result in punishment grossly out of
70
proportion to the gravity of the offense.” None of these concepts
appear in the text of the statute. Nonetheless, they seemed to
influence the court’s resolution of the question, which focused on
71
the heinousness of Stangvik’s crimes. The court also noted that
the district court “was not insensitive to the severity of the
punishment” and that it “permitted” two of the charges to be
72
reduced to second-degree murder.
From this disturbing case was born a new doctrine: the
“multiple-victim exception” to section 609.035.
Under this
exception, a district court may impose not one sentence per
behavioral incident but rather one sentence per victim per
73
behavioral incident. The one sentence to be imposed was to be
the sentence for the most serious crime committed against that
74
victim during the behavioral incident.
Subsequent to Stangvik, the Minnesota Supreme Court added
to the multiple-victim exception a caveat: when a court sentences a
defendant for several crimes committed against multiple victims
during a single behavioral incident, the total sentence cannot
75
“unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”
The purpose of this exception to the exception was to maintain in
multiple-victim cases some consideration into the proportionality
68. See Stangvik, 281 Minn. at 359–61, 161 N.W.2d at 672–73.
69. Id. at 361,161 N.W.2d at 673.
70. Id. at 361, 161 N.W.2d at 672–73.
71. See id. at 361, 161 N.W.2d at 672 (comparing case at bar to hypothetical
robbery, auto-theft, and kidnapping case and further noting that defendant in
hypothetical “might present a more persuasive case”).
72. Id. at 361, 161 N.W.2d at 673.
73. See State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Minn. 2000) (holding that
court may impose “one sentence per victim”); State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440,
453 (Minn. 1997) (“[O]ne sentence may be imposed per victim in multiple-victim
cases.” (citing State v. Marquardt, 294 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn. 1980))).
74. See State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 400, 141 N.W.2d 517, 522 (1966).
75. Marquart, 294 N.W.2d at 851; State v. DeFoe, 280 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn.
1979).
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76

of the sentence to the defendant’s conduct.
Essentially, the
“unfairly exaggerate” standard allows appellate courts to reduce
sentences that the appellate court deems too long, even if the
sentence is technically permissible under the other sentencing
77
rules.
B.

The Problems with the Multiple-Victim Exception

There are several problems with the multiple-victim exception
as it currently stands. Application of the exception can lead to
precisely the kind of charge-based sentencing disparities that
section 609.035 was enacted to prevent. More broadly, the
exception is problematic because it was created by the Minnesota
Supreme Court and is not tied to any statutory language. This
judicial usurpation of legislative power is problematic because,
without a strong statutory foundation, the terms of the exception
and how it applies to a particular situation are always subject to
change. The next section attempts to outline these problems in
more detail.
1.

The Multiple-Victim Exception Allows for the Kind of ChargeBased Sentencing Disparities That Section 609.035 Was Enacted
to Avoid

The multiple-victim exception allows for exactly the kind of
charge-based disparity in sentencing that section 609.035 was
designed to prevent. Consider, for example, the case of Michael
78
Ferguson.
Ferguson and his brothers, Marcus and Matthew
Dillard, were in a van when Marcus fired several shots towards a
79
80
duplex house in St. Paul. Matthew was the driver. According to
the Dillard brothers’ testimony at Michael Ferguson’s trial, Michael
76. See State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 606 n.6 (Minn. 2009) (using
“unfairly exaggerate” standard to refute suggestion that multiple-victim exception
“does not incorporate notions of proportionality”).
77. See, e.g., State v. Goulette, 442 N.W.2d 793, 794–95 (Minn. 1989)
(holding that imposition of several consecutive sentences, although allowable
under multiple-victim exception, unfairly exaggerated the criminality of the
defendant’s conduct).
78. See State v. Ferguson (Ferguson I), No. A08-1237, 2009 WL 3172139, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2009); State v. Ferguson (Ferguson II), 786 N.W.2d 640
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, State v. Ferguson (Ferguson III), 808 N.W.2d 586
(Minn. 2012).
79. Ferguson I, 2009 WL 3172139, at *1.
80. Id.
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handed Marcus the gun Marcus used to commit the shooting. As
it turned out, there were eight people inside one of the apartments
82
in the duplex, including at least one sleeping baby.
Each brother was initially charged with one count of drive-by
shooting of an occupied building and one count of second-degree
83
assault. The Dillard brothers accepted plea offers under which
they each received a single sentence of, respectively, forty-one or
84
seventy-two months in prison.
The State offered Ferguson the same deal. But Ferguson
pleaded not guilty and exercised his constitutional right to a trial.
On the eve of trial, the State amended the complaint to charge a
total of nine crimes: one count of drive-by shooting and eight
counts of second-degree assault, one count for each occupant of
85
the duplex. Ferguson was convicted of and ultimately sentenced
86
for all nine crimes.
His total sentence, reached after partially
81. Id.
82. Id. at *2.
83. See Complaint at 1, State v. Ferguson, No. K1-07-3464 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Oct. 1, 2007). A person commits a drive-by shooting if he or she recklessly
discharges a firearm at or towards a building; the sentence for the crime is
enhanced if the building is occupied. MINN. STAT. § 609.66, subdiv. 1e(b) (2012).
A person commits a second-degree assault by using a dangerous weapon to do an
act intended to cause another person to fear death or immediate bodily harm. Id.
§ 609.222, subdiv. 1. Under the second-degree assault statute, it matters not
whether the person targeted by the assault was actually frightened or even knew
about the act, and it matters not whether the defendant even knew that the named
victim existed. See State v. Hough, 585 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1997) (affirming
convictions for six counts of second-degree assault where defendant fired multiple
shots at a home occupied by six people at the time, two of whom were sleeping
children who did not know about the shots and about whom defendant did not
know).
84. The details of the Dillard brothers’ sentences are included in
Defendant’s Motion and Memorandum for Sentencing Departure and Position
with Respect to Sentencing at 4–5, No. K1-07-3464 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 28, 2008).
Marcus Dillard pleaded guilty to drive-by shooting under a plea agreement, which
called for him to receive a forty-eight-month sentence if he appeared for
sentencing and a seventy-two-month sentence if he did not. Marcus did not
appear at the originally scheduled sentencing hearing, and he therefore received a
seventy-two-month sentence. Matthew Dillard appeared for the scheduled
sentencing hearing and was sentenced to forty-one months in prison. Id.
85. See Amended Complaint at 1–2, State v. Ferguson, No. K1-07-3464 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 17, 2007).
86. Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d 586, 589 (Minn. 2012). The district court
initially sentenced Ferguson on the assault counts but not the drive-by shooting,
for a total sentence of seventy-five months in prison. The Minnesota Court of
Appeals affirmed his convictions but reversed the sentences, holding that the
court should sentence Ferguson in accordance with the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2009). Ferguson I, No.
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Hernandizing his criminal-history score and imposing some of the
sentences consecutively to one another, was seventy-five months in
87
prison. The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately held that the
88
sentences were proper under the multiple-victim exception.
The prosecution in Ferguson used the multiple-victim exception
to do what section 609.035 was designed to prevent: use convictions
for multiple offenses committed during a single behavioral
incident to drive up the defendant’s sentence. The use of multiple
charges to increase the sentence was particularly jarring in this case
because the multiple charges did not require the State to prove any
additional conduct. The State was able to convict Ferguson of
eight counts of assault even though it did not have to prove that he
intended to assault eight people or that eight people knew they
89
were being assaulted.
The prosecution used the exception to
effectively charge-bargain with Ferguson and his brothers. The
Dillard brothers were able to avoid additional charges and
additional sentences by pleading guilty, but Ferguson—who elected
90
to maintain his plea of not guilty—was not.
If the legislature
intended to allow the late addition of multiple charges for offenses
committed during a single behavioral incident to drive the total
sentence, no such intent is evident in the plain language of section
609.035. To the contrary, the language of that statute indicates
that the legislature intended the exact opposite.

A08-1237, 2009 WL 3172139, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2009). In Franks, the
supreme court held that when a defendant commits a series of crimes during a
single behavioral incident, the court must impose a sentence only on the single
most serious crime, even where imposing consecutive sentences on several lessserious crimes would result in a longer total sentence. Franks, 765 N.W.2d at 77–
78. Ferguson argued that under Franks, the district court should have sentenced
him only for the drive-by shooting and not for the assaults. See Ferguson I, 2009 WL
3172139, at *5. On remand, the district court sentenced Ferguson for drive-by
shooting and each count of second-degree assault. Ferguson II, 786 N.W.2d 640,
642 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). The court of appeals reversed the sentences again,
holding that the district court had violated section 609.035 and Franks. Id. at 644–
45. The Minnesota Supreme Court then reversed the court of appeals and
affirmed the sentences. Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 592.
87. Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 589.
88. Id. at 592.
89. See Ferguson I, 2009 WL 3172139, at *2–3.
90. In his appeals, Ferguson challenged his sentences on, among other
grounds, the argument that they were imposed to punish him for exercising his
constitutional right to a trial. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
sentences without addressing the argument, thus at least implicitly rejecting it. See
Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 592.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/5

16

Butler: The Exception That Swallowed the Rule: Fixing the Multiple-Victim

1568

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

2.

[Vol. 39:5

The Exception Was Born of Dubious Statutory Interpretation and,
as a Result, Is Subject to Change on a Case-by-Case Basis

The more holistic problem with the exception is that it was
born of dubious statutory interpretation. Because the exception is
untethered to any statutory language, its terms and the details of its
application to a given case are subject to change.
a.

Judicial Creation of an Exception to a Statutory Rule
Violates Principles of Statutory Construction

The judicial creation of an exception to a statutory command
runs counter to several well-established principles of statutory
construction.
First, section 609.035 unambiguously did not, and still does
not, contain a multiple-victim exception to its otherwise bright-line
rule. This lack of ambiguity should have precluded the court from
inquiring into whether the legislature intended to allow multiple
91
Ambiguity in a
sentences for crimes against multiple victims.
statute’s language is a threshold issue for any statutory
92
interpretation.
That is, a statute is only subject to judicial
interpretation when it is “susceptible to more than one reasonable
93
As such, an unambiguous statute presents no
interpretation.”
occasion for statutory construction or inquiry into legislative
94
intent.
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not follow this
principle when it created the multiple-victim exception. The plain
language of section 609.035 unambiguously did not and does not
contain a multiple-victim exception. Moreover, the statute’s
exceptions have been anything but ambiguous since enactment. In
light of the statute’s unambiguous language, the court should not
have inquired into legislative intent.
91. See State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353, 360, 161 N.W.2d 667,
672 (1968) (holding that “the legislature did not intend” to prohibit imposition of
multiple sentences against separate victims).
92. See State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009) (“The threshold
issue in any statutory interpretation analysis is whether the statute’s language is
ambiguous.” (citation omitted)).
93. State v. Heiges, 806 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Minn. 2011) (citing Premier Bank v.
Becker Dev., L.L.C., 785 N.W.2d 753, 760 (Minn. 2010)).
94. See State v. Campbell, 814 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2012) (“Only if a statute is
ambiguous will we engage in statutory construction.” (citing Peck, 773 N.W.2d at
772)); Green Giant Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 534 N.W.2d 710, 712 (Minn. 1995)
(“No room for judicial construction exists when the statute speaks for itself.”
(quoting Comm’r of Revenue v. Richardson, 302 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Minn. 1981))).
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Second, by creating the multiple-victim exception, the court
essentially added language to section 609.035 under the guise of
interpreting it. This is normally impermissible. When a statute’s
language is clear, a court is bound by the language and may not
95
read into the statute a provision that the legislature omitted. This
96
is true regardless of the intent or inadvertence of the omission.
Minnesota courts have repeatedly held that decisions regarding
statutes’ amendments are firmly within the province of the
97
legislature, not the judiciary.
As such, the court’s reading a
multiple-victim exception into section 609.035 where none existed
was an overreach of the court’s authority, which simultaneously
98
undercut the legislature’s power.
Third, the legislature’s failure to enact a multiple-victim
exception to section 609.035, in light of the numerous other
legislatively created exceptions, indicates a legislative intent not to
create such an exception at all. Where the legislature is aware of its
authority to create exceptions to a statute and has exercised that
99
authority, a court is barred from creating further exceptions.
Such an action by the court violates the canon of statutory
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or “the expression of
100
one thing is the exclusion of [the other].”
The expressio unius
doctrine reflects the inference that any legislative omissions in a
statute are intentional, particularly when the language of the
95. See Munger v. State, 749 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Minn. 2008) (“[W]here the
language of the statute is clear, the court is bound to give effect thereto.” (quoting
State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 156–57 (Minn. 2000))).
96. See Reiter v. Kiffmeyer, 721 N.W.2d 908, 911 (Minn. 2006) (noting that a
court “will not read into a statute a provision that the legislature has omitted,
either purposely or inadvertently” (citing Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n v. Cnty.
of Hennepin, 561 N.W.2d 513, 516–17 (Minn. 1997))).
97. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d 672, 684 (Minn. 2008) (“[I]t is
the prerogative of the legislature, not this court, to extend the statute
accordingly.”); Beardsley v. Garcia, 753 N.W.2d 735, 740 (Minn. 2008) (“The
prerogative of amending a statute . . . belongs to the legislature, not to this
court.”); Martinco v. Hastings, 265 Minn. 490, 497, 122 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1963)
(“If there is to be a change in the statute, it must come from the legislature . . . .”).
98. See Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 698 N.W.2d 1, 12
(Minn. 2005) (“[W]e are unwilling to write into a statute what the legislature did
not.” (citing Green Giant, 534 N.W.2d at 712)); State ex rel. Verbon v. St. Louis
Cnty., 216 Minn. 140, 145, 12 N.W.2d 193, 196 (1943) (“Courts cannot amend a
statute under the pretext of construction.” (citing Ledin v. Holm, 203 Minn. 434,
281 N.W. 762 (1938))).
99. See State v. Williams, 771 N.W.2d 514, 523 (Minn. 2009).
100. Id. (quoting Nelson v. Productive Alts., Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Minn.
2006)).
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101

statute supports such an inference.
State v. Williams provides an example of the application of the
102
expressio unius doctrine.
In Williams, the Court considered
whether the Sentencing Guidelines permitted use of the Hernandez
103
method in calculating a defendant’s criminal history score when
he was sentenced under the statutory felon-in-possession-of-a104
firearm exception to section 609.035.
The court considered the
fact that the Sentencing Guidelines Commission had “carefully
considered the applicability of the Hernandez method to sentencing
in several contexts” over the prior thirteen years, creating specific
105
The court “decline[d] to step in where
prohibitions to its use.
the Commission ha[d] decided not to act” and held that the
expressio unius doctrine prohibited extending the exception for
106
Hernandizing to felon-in-possession cases.
Like the Hernandez method, section 609.035 applies broadly
but with exceptions which have been gradually and periodically
107
carved out by the legislature.
In light of the legislature’s
exemption of certain offenses from the one-sentence rule, its
failure to exempt crimes involving multiple victims from the
108
statute’s ambit implicates the expressio unius doctrine. That is, the
legislature’s silence on a multiple-victim exception creates an
109
inference that it desired no such exception.
It might be argued that, by its silence on the question, the
101. See State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011) (citing 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.25 (7th ed. 2007)).
102. 771 N.W.2d at 520–21.
103. Recall that the “Hernandez method” is implicated when a defendant is
being sentenced on the same day for offenses arising out of different behavioral
incidents and involving different victims. See id. at 521–22. Hernandez permits a
court to use an offense for which the defendant is being sentenced to enhance his
criminal history score in calculating a subsequent sentence to be imposed that
same day. See State v. Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Minn. 1981); see also
Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 521–22.
104. See Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 520.
105. Id. at 523.
106. Id. at 523–24.
107. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.035 (1965) (providing one exception to the
single behavioral incident rule), and MINN. STAT. § 609.035 (2012) (providing
several additional exceptions to the single behavioral incident rule), with
Hernandez, 311 N.W.2d at 478 (broadly creating the Hernandez method), and
Williams, 711 N.W.2d at 522 (noting the three exceptions that the Sentencing
Commission had carved from the Hernandez method).
108. See Williams, 771 N.W.2d at 523.
109. See id. at 524.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

19

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 5

2013]

FIXING THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION

1571

legislature has acquiesced to the propriety of the multiple-victim
110
This argument would be misplaced for two reasons.
exception.
First, legislative silence in the wake of Stangvik does not necessarily
mean that Stangvik was rightly decided or, more to the point, that
Stangvik was a proper application of principles of statutory
construction. More practically, legislative options in this situation
were quite limited. The plain language of section 609.035 already
appeared to prohibit the imposition of multiple sentences per
behavioral incident. Adding language akin to “including in cases
involving multiple victims” would have been redundant.
Finally, the court relied on its own policy opinion about the
propriety of imposing multiple sentences in a particular case to
create the multiple-victim exception. In Stangvik, the court
affirmed the imposition of multiple sentences—stating that such
111
sentencing “does not offend our sense of justice.”
Ordinarily,
courts do not interpret statutes to conform to the Minnesota
112
Supreme Court’s policy positions; rather, policy considerations
113
expressed in statute remain the province of the legislature. Even
where the language of the statute leads to an unintended result, it
remains the prerogative of the legislature, not the courts, to correct
114
it.
Because it is for the legislature to determine policy
implications in enacting and amending statutes, the court relying
on its “sense of justice” to create the multiple-victim exception to
115
section 609.035 was inappropriate.

110. See State v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696, 700 (Minn. 2003) (“We have
recognized that when the legislature does not amend our construction of a statute,
the court’s construction stands.” (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. Spaeth, 232 Minn.
128, 131–32, 44 N.W.2d 440, 441–42 (1958))); see also § MINN. STAT. 645.17(4)
(2012) (“[W]hen a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the
legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same
construction to be placed upon such language . . . .”).
111. State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353, 361, 161 N.W.2d 667, 673
(1968).
112. See Arlandson v. Humphrey, 224 Minn. 49, 56, 27 N.W.2d 819, 823 (1947)
(“We cannot, however much we might wish to do so, change or expand legislation
by judicial interpretation to conform to our personal views.”).
113. See State v. Rodriguez, 754 N.W.2d 672, 684 (Minn. 2008); Isles Wellness,
Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 513, 524 (Minn. 2005) (noting that,
while the court agrees that the policies supporting certain statutes may need
reexamination, the legislature, not the courts, is “the proper forum to enact such
policy change”).
114. See Haghighi v. Russ.-Am. Broad. Co., 577 N.W.2d 927, 930 (Minn. 1998).
115. Stangvik, 281 Minn. at 361, 161 N.W.2d at 673.
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Because It Is Unmoored from the Language of a Statute, the
Multiple-Victim Exception Is Subject to Change on a Case-byCase Basis

Because the multiple-victim exception is unmoored from the
language of section 609.035, application of the exception can
change on a case-to-case basis. In Ferguson III, for example, the
Minnesota Supreme Court changed the exception in two dramatic
ways.
Before that case, courts applying the multiple-victim
exception had affirmed the imposition of no more than one
116
sentence per victim per behavioral incident.
The court had
never before affirmed the imposition of more sentences than there
117
But in Ferguson
were victims in a particular behavioral incident.
III, a case involving at most eight victims, the court affirmed the
118
imposition of nine sentences.
The court did so by holding that
the drive-by shooting of an occupied building was a victimless
119
crime.
This result was unprecedented and was at least arguably
120
This
contrary to previous supreme court decisions in this area.
expansion of the multiple-victim exception not only runs afoul of
the plain language of section 609.035 but also goes beyond the
point of the multiple-victim exception, which is to account for each
person victimized during a single behavioral incident.
Ferguson III also changed the exception in a second dramatic
way. In Part II of its opinion, the court held that the district court
116. See, e.g., State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 878 (Minn. 2000); State v.
Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 453 (Minn. 1997).
117. This was true even where the intended victim of an offense was not so
clear. In State v. Rieck, 286 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1979), for example, the defendant
firebombed a house in an attempt to intimidate a person the defendant thought
was inside against being a witness against the defendant’s half-brother. Id. at 724–
25. The intended target was not inside the house, but five other people were. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the district court properly imposed
separate sentences for one count of attempted witness tampering and five counts
of assault. Id. at 726–27. This was because each crime had a separate “victim”—
the absent potential witness was the victim of the tampering charge, and each
occupant of the house was a victim of his or her own assault. Id.
118. Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d 586, 592 (Minn. 2012).
119. See id. at 591 (holding that victims of assaults who were inside building
were not also victims of drive-by shooting at an occupied building); see also id. at
594–96 (Anderson, P., J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority for holding that
drive-by shooting of an occupied building is a “victimless crime”).
120. See id. at 597 (Anderson, P., J., dissenting) (citing State v. Skipintheday,
717 N.W.2d 423, 427 (Minn. 2006)) (discussing case in which the court held that
crimes without concrete victims did not qualify for sentencing under multiplevictim exception). This was the topic of Ferguson’s petition for rehearing, which
the court denied.
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could impose sentences for drive-by shooting and for assault
against the building’s occupants because the building’s occupants
121
were not victims of drive-by shooting.
In Part III of the opinion,
the court wrote that even if it was wrong and that “drive-by shooting
at an occupied building [was] the most serious offense committed
against each victim,” the district court still could properly have
122
imposed multiple sentences for drive-by shooting and assault.
This was true, the court wrote, because the rationale behind section
609.035—that punishment for the most serious crime committed
during a behavioral incident includes and adequately accounts for
punishment for all crimes committed during that incident—“does
123
not hold true” in this situation.
The court opined that
sentencing Ferguson only for the most serious offense committed
during the behavioral incident “fails to reflect Ferguson’s increased
culpability for committing an act of violence with the intent to
124
harm more than one person.” The court then pronounced a new
rule: when “a sentence on the most serious offense unfairly
depreciates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct,” the rule
that a defendant may only be sentenced on the most serious
125
offense per victim “does not apply.”
121. Id. at 590–92 (majority opinion).
122. Id. at 592. Part III of the court’s opinion in Ferguson III is arguably dicta
because the court affirmed Ferguson’s sentences in Part II of its opinion and
therefore the discussion in Part III was not necessary to the holding of the case.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 709 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (defining dictum as “language in a decision not necessary to the
holding”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “obiter
dictum” as “[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but
one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential
(although it may be considered persuasive)”). But the Minnesota Supreme Court
has defined dicta more narrowly, as “expressions in a court’s opinion which go
beyond the facts before the court and therefore are the individual views of the
author of the opinion and not binding in subsequent cases.” State v. Timberlake,
744 N.W.2d 390, 395 n.7 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 246
Minn. 181, 208, 74 N.W.2d 249, 266 (1956)). Part III of Ferguson III does not “go
beyond the facts before the court,” id., and therefore Part III is probably not dicta
under the standard articulated in Timberlake.
123. Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 592.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 592 n.4 (citation omitted). The footnote actually referenced “the
rule announced in Kebaso.” Id. (citation omitted). The only rule announced in
Kebaso was that a sentencing court may not consider possible immigration
consequences of a particular crime when determining which of several crimes is
the most serious. State v. Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2006) (“We
granted review on the narrow issue of whether the court of appeals erred in
refusing to consider the potential immigration consequences to Kebaso when
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This new rule was unprecedented. It also generates a host of
questions. When does sentencing on the most serious offense
“unfairly depreciate[] the criminality of the defendant’s
126
conduct”?
What standard should courts use to determine
whether this is the case? How much depreciation must exist before
the depreciation becomes unfair? To whom must the final
sentence be unfair: the victim or victims, the prosecution, or society
in general? If sentencing a defendant for the most serious offense
127
“unfairly depreciates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct,”
can the sentencing court choose a different offense on which to
sentence the defendant, or can the sentencing court ignore section
609.035 altogether if the court determines that the rationale
128
behind the statute “does not hold true”?
The court did not
address any of these questions or provide any guidance to lower
courts on how to apply this new standard. Taken to its logical
conclusion, the new rule of Ferguson III threatens to gut the
protections of section 609.035 or at least reduce the previously
mandatory statute to an optional one based upon an exercise of
judicial discretion.
3.

The “Unfairly Exaggerates” Standard Is Insufficient to Ensure
Rational and Proportional Sentences Imposed Under the MultipleVictim Exception

Recall that when a court imposes multiple sentences for
offenses committed against several victims during the same
behavioral incident, the total sentence imposed cannot unfairly
129
exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct. This rule
is designed to ensure that sentences imposed under the exception
130
are proportional to the defendant’s conduct. The rule is difficult
to apply, however, because the Minnesota Supreme Court has
never set forth a specific standard for determining whether a
deciding which sentence to vacate.”). It appears that the court in Ferguson III was
referring to Kebaso’s discussion of the then almost fifty-year-old rule requiring
sentencing on the most serious offense per victim per behavioral incident. See Act
Relating to Crimes and Punishment, ch. 753, art. 1 § 609.035, 1963 Minn. Laws
1185, 1188 (1963) (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 609.035, subdiv. 1
(2012)); State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 399, 141 N.W.2d 517, 522 (1966).
126. Ferguson III, 808 N.W.2d at 592 n.4.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 592.
129. See State v. Marquart, 294 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn. 1980).
130. See State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 606 n.6 (Minn. 2009).
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sentence is proportional to or unfairly exaggerates the criminality
131
of a defendant’s conduct. Not surprisingly, this lack of clarity can
lead to inconsistent results.
For example, in State v. Norris the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment plus a
consecutive 300-month prison term, which was the result of
imposing six consecutive sentences for crimes committed against
multiple victims, unfairly exaggerated the criminality of the
132
defendant’s conduct.
In reaching its conclusion, the court
focused not on the defendant’s conduct—shooting up a bar full of
patrons and killing one of them—but rather on the number of
133
consecutive sentences imposed. Other than noting that in other
cases it had affirmed the imposition of two or three consecutive
sentences, but never six, the court provided no guidance on why
the sentences imposed in Norris were so unfair as to require
134
reversal.
Six years later, in State v. Cole, the court affirmed the
imposition of six consecutive sentences for murder, assault, and
135
kidnapping.
In Cole, the court focused not on the number of
consecutive sentences but rather on the heinousness of the
136
defendant’s conduct. The court did not cite or distinguish Norris
but instead relied upon a case in which it had affirmed the
137
Situations like this
imposition of two consecutive sentences.
reveal that district courts have little guidance on when the
imposition of numerous sentences under the multiple-victim
exception will be deemed excessive.
In applying the “unfairly exaggerated” standard, courts often
compare the facts and sentences in the case at bar to the facts and

131. Sometimes Minnesota’s appellate courts use their “collective, collegial
experience in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals” to determine
whether the imposition of multiple sentences, or the total length of such a
sentence, is unreasonable. State v. Rhoades, 690 N.W.2d 135, 140 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004) (citing State v. Miller, 488 N.W.2d 235, 241 (Minn. 1992)). Often this
review involves comparing the facts and sentence of the case at bar to the facts of
other, purportedly similar sentences. See, e.g., State v. Vickla, 793 N.W.2d 265,
270–71 (Minn. 2011).
132. 428 N.W.2d 61, 70–71 (Minn. 1988).
133. See id.
134. See id.; see also State v. Goulette, 442 N.W.2d 793, 794–95 (Minn. 1989).
135. 542 N.W.2d 43, 53 (Minn. 1996).
136. See id.
137. See id. (citing State v. Montalvo, 324 N.W.2d 650, 652 (Minn. 1982)).
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138

sentences in other cases.
Even this standard is difficult to apply
because courts often struggle with identifying appropriately
comparable offenses, and individual justices can view a particular
sentence in dramatically different ways. In State v. Poole, for
example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the imposition
of six consecutive sentences totaling eighteen years for several
counts of fourth-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offenses
139
committed against separate victims.
The court acted as such
because “[d]espite the egregious facts, [the court found] it . . .
troubling that Poole received a sentence (216 months) substantially
greater than the presumptive sentence for felony murder (150
140
months).” The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the sentence
141
But Justice Tomljanovich
reduction without much comment.
dissented from the portion of the opinion affirming the sentence
142
reduction.
In her mind, the original eighteen-year sentence did
not unfairly exaggerate the criminality of the defendant’s
143
Justice Tomljanovich would have held that the
conduct.
reduction of the sentence “minimizes the criminality of his conduct”
and would have compared the total sentence to not one but rather
144
sixteen felony murders.
Because neither the majority nor the
dissent provided much rationale for their respective opinions,
decisions like Poole provide little guidance for lower courts on
whether a particular sentence, which appears otherwise lawful, will
be deemed unfair.
In the next section, this article encourages the legislature to
step back into this arena and provide guidance to courts on how to
sentence defendants who commit several crimes during a single
behavioral incident.
IV. THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD AMEND SECTION 609.035 TO CODIFY
THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION AND CLARIFY THAT THE
EXCEPTION SHOULD NOT SWALLOW THE RULE.
This article proposes that the Minnesota legislature should
amend section 609.035 to codify the multiple-victim exception.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

See, e.g., State v. Vickla, 793 N.W.2d 265, 270–71 (Minn. 2011).
489 N.W.2d 537, 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
Id.
See State v. Poole, 499 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Minn. 1993).
See id. at 36–37 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).
See id.
Id.
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The legislature should do so in a way that ensures that the
exception will not be used as a charge-bargaining weapon, that the
exception will not drive sentences to unreasonable lengths, and
that the exception will not swallow the rule against multiple
sentences or the rationale behind it.
Before we begin, however, a quick word about legislative
authority in this area is in order. Under Minnesota’s constitutional
separation-of-powers principles, “The power to fix the limits of
145
punishment for criminal acts lies with the legislature.”
The
legislature may use this power to limit the range of sentencing
opinions available to a judge in a particular case. The legislature
has done so in many situations, including by enacting mandatory
sentencing guidelines, mandatory-minimum sentencing statutes,
146
and section 609.035 itself. Under these principles, the legislature
would act appropriately by amending section 609.035 to account
for, and/or to limit, the multiple-victim exception. This is
particularly true because the supreme court has contended that the
multiple-victim exception stemmed from its opinion about the
147
intent of the legislature.
The legislature is therefore free to
148
express its actual intent by amending the statute.
The multiple-victim exception is worth preserving—at least
partially. Imposing one sentence per victim can, in some number
of cases, produce perfectly just sentencing results. However, for
the reasons discussed above, the legislature should limit the
exception so that it does not swallow the rule or its rationale. In
order to do so, the legislature could amend section 609.035 as
follows:

145. State v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Minn. 2004) (quoting State v.
Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 68 (Minn. 2002)).
146. See State v. Shattuck, 704 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 2005) (holding that
sentencing guidelines are mandatory); Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d at 653 (upholding
mandatory-minimum sentencing provision); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (holding that creation of federal sentencing guidelines
did not violate federal separation-of-powers principles).
147. See State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn. 1995) (multiplevictim exception was based upon the court’s “interpretation of the legislative
intent as expressed in the wording of the statute”); State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash,
281 Minn. 353, 360, 161 N.W.2d 667, 672 (1968) (contending that “the legislature
did not intend” to disallow multiple punishments for crimes against multiple
victims).
148. This is particularly true because “the statutory text is the authoritative
statement of legislative intent.” Gassler v. State, 787 N.W.2d 575, 584 n.9 (Minn.
2010) (citing Goodman v. Best Buy, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 2010)).
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Subd. 7. Exception; multiple victims. Notwithstanding
subdivision 1, when a case involves offenses committed
against multiple victims during a single behavioral
incident, a court may, subject to the limitations expressed
herein, impose one conviction and sentence per offense
per victim. When proceeding under this subdivision, the
court shall impose a sentence for the most serious crime
committed against each victim. The court shall determine
which crime is most serious by comparing the statutorymaximum sentences and the offense-severity levels under
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. If those provisions
are equal or do not apply, the court may compare the
nature of the offenses. A court proceeding under this
subdivision shall not impose more than two convictions
and sentences per behavioral incident.
This type of amendment would address several of the
problems with the court-created exception. It would codify the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decades-old, common-sense standard
149
for determining which of several offenses is most serious.
The
standard is easy to apply and, because it is largely objective, should
lead to consistent and rational results by judges considering similar
cases. Given that the legislature and the Sentencing Guidelines
Commission have spent decades making policy decisions regarding
the seriousness of offenses—as expressed in statutory maximum
sentences and severity-level rankings—there is no reason for the
courts to not follow their respective leads.
By providing that the court “shall” impose sentences only on
the most serious offense committed against a particular victim, the
amendment should prevent Part III of the Minnesota Supreme
150
Court’s opinion in Ferguson III from gutting section 609.035.
Recall that in Ferguson III, the court held that the district court did
149. See State v. Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2007) (citing cases
dating back to 1980 as providing guidance on determining which of several
offenses is most serious).
150. The amendment would negate Part III of Ferguson III because it provides
that the court “shall impose a sentence for the most serious crime” committed
against each victim and goes on to describe how a court is to decide which crime is
most serious. The word “shall” imposes a mandatory duty. See Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d
at 652 (holding that a sentencing statute providing that the court “shall” impose a
jail term was a mandatory requirement (citing State v. Humes, 581 N.W.2d 317,
319 (Minn. 1998))). Under the proposed amendment, the court would not be
free to disregard the “most serious crime” rule, as it is under Ferguson III.
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not need to impose a sentence on the most serious offense per
victim if the court determined that doing so would “unfairly
151
depreciate[] the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.”
The
proposed amendment replaces that vague standard with a clear,
easy-to-apply statutory rule—a rule that will ensure that the
defendant is sentenced for the most serious crime he or she
commits against a particular victim. The “most serious crime” rule
has served Minnesota well since 1963, and the legislature should
make sure that the rule continues to do so.
The proposed amendment would replace the “unfairly
exaggerates” standard with a more objective limit on sentencing:
the statute should cap at two the total number of sentences a
district court may impose under the multiple-victim exception.
This type of “hard cap,” or objective limit on the number and thus
the length of sentences to be imposed, is much easier to apply than
the current “soft cap,” which asks whether the total sentence
unfairly exaggerates—whatever that means—the criminality of the
152
defendant’s conduct.
Replacing the “unfairly exaggerates”
standard with a two-sentence rule solves the problem of
inconsistent results caused by the current “soft cap” described
above. An objective two-sentence rule is clearer and much easier to
apply than the subjective “unfairly exaggerates” rule.
The
proposed standard is objective, and therefore it will lead to lessdiverse sentencing results—one of the goals of Minnesota’s
153
sentencing system.
A two-sentence rule will also eliminate an
incentive for the kind of charge-bargaining which occurred in
Ferguson III because the prosecution will not have an incentive to
load up the complaint with duplicative charges, which could result
in multiple and longer sentences.
Furthermore, the “unfairly exaggerates” portion of the
multiple-victim exception is unnecessary. In every case, an appellate
court may review a sentence to determine if it is “inconsistent with
statutory requirements, unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive,
unjustifiably disparate, or not warranted by the findings of fact
154
issued by the district court.”
Appellate courts can use this

151. 808 N.W.2d 586, 592 n.4 (Minn. 2012).
152. See State v. Skipintheday, 717 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Minn. 2006).
153. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1 (2012) (stating the goal of the
sentencing guidelines is essentially to ensure that defendants with similar criminal
histories who commit similar crimes receive similar sentences).
154. MINN. STAT. § 244.11, subdiv. 2(b) (2012).
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authority to reduce an unreasonably long sentence even if the
“unfairly exaggerates” standard is replaced by a two-sentence
155
rule.
A two-sentence rule for the multiple-victim exception would be
consistent with the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines’ provisions
on determining how many criminal-history points to assign a
defendant who was sentenced under that exception.
The
Guidelines provide as follows regarding calculating a criminalhistory score: “When multiple current convictions arise out of a
single course of conduct in which there were multiple victims,
weights are given only to the two offenses at the highest severity
156
levels.” The purpose of this provision is “[t]o limit the impact of
157
past variability in prosecutorial [charging] discretion,” which fits
with the purpose of the proposed two-sentence amendment to
section 609.035. While the Sentencing Guidelines Commission
purported to be concerned about “past variability in prosecutorial
158
discretion,” there is no evidence that such variability is only a
thing of the past.
The Guidelines’ rule is similar to the proposed amendment
because both are concerned with multiple sentences imposed
during a “single course of conduct” or “single behavioral incident.”
The Guidelines’ provision applies “to a situation in which a crime
or crimes are committed against multiple victims during the course
of an incident which is limited in time and place,” a standard similar to
the test for when multiple crimes were committed during a single
159
behavioral incident for purposes of section 609.035.
Given the
similarities between the two concepts, it is not surprising that
appellate courts have looked to cases interpreting the “single
behavioral incident” requirement of section 609.035 for guidance
on what constitutes a “single course of conduct” under the
160
Guidelines.
The Sentencing Guidelines-based two-sentence rule
155. See Neal v. State, 658 N.W.2d 536, 547–48 (Minn. 2003) (acting under
authority of section 244.11, subdivision 2, to reduce 480-month sentence for
kidnapping because sentence was “not commensurate with the gravity of the
crime”).
156. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.B.1.e(2).
157. Id. § 2.B.110.
158. Id.
159. State v. Parr, 414 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); see also State v.
Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 293–96 (Minn. 1995) (explaining “single behavioral
incident” standard).
160. See State v. Watkins, No. A11-1324, 2012 WL 3155948, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 6, 2012), rev. denied, (Minn. Oct. 24, 2012) (relying on State v. Banks,

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

29

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 5

2013]

FIXING THE MULTIPLE-VICTIM EXCEPTION

1581

has not generated any controversial decisions or, indeed, much
case law at all. The lack of controversy surrounding the Sentencing
Guidelines’ version of the two-sentence rule shows that such a rule
can be applied in a fair, evenhanded way and will lead to fair
results.
A two-sentence rule might be subject to a couple of criticisms.
First, a limit of two sentences might be deemed arbitrary. This
same criticism, however, would hold against any numerical limit on
sentencing.
Why, for example, must certain second-time
161
controlled-substance-crime offenders serve six months in jail?
Why not a three-month term, a one-month term, or a nine-month
term? In addition, by equating the number of sentences that could
be imposed with the already-existing two-sentence rule of the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, the proposed amendment
would not be arbitrary. Instead, the goal of the amendment would
be to make sentencing under the multiple-victim exception
consistent with well-established sentencing law in a similar area.
Furthermore, following the lead of the Sentencing Guidelines
Commission is particularly appropriate because “on most issues,
the commission retains primary control over sentencing policy
162
formulation.”
A second, more valid criticism might be that under the twosentence rule a defendant might not receive a separate punishment
for offending against a particular victim if the behavioral incident
at issue involved more than two victims. One of the purposes of the
multiple-victim exception is to account in the punishment for a
163
crime or crimes for each victim.
But even under a two-sentence
rule, the total sentence imposed can account for all of the victims
of a crime. A court may impose a sentence of aggravated duration
upon a defendant whose criminal conduct puts several people at
risk of harm even where the defendant is convicted and sentenced
164
Thus, while a defendant who is
for several of the offenses.
331 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 1983), interpreting the “single behavioral incident”
rule to decide whether defendant’s prior crimes occurred during a “single course
of conduct” under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines). The author of this
article represented the appellant in Watkins.
161. See State v. Bluhm, 676 N.W.2d 649, 651–53 (Minn. 2004) (holding that
the second-time offender must serve, at minimum, a six-month jail sentence).
162. Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978–2003, 32 CRIME
& JUST. 131, 204 (2005).
163. See State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash, 281 Minn. 353, 361, 161 N.W.2d 667,
673 (1968).
164. See State v. Edwards, 774 N.W.2d 596, 606–07 (Minn. 2009) (holding that
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convicted of multiple offenses against multiple victims might only
be able to be sentenced for two of those crimes, at least one of
those sentences might be enhanceable because of the existence of
165
other victims.
Finally, the legislature would legitimize and endorse the
multiple-victim exception by codifying it. Codification of the
multiple-victim exception would neutralize criticism, such as that in
this article, that the exception itself is invalid. More importantly,
codification would finally moor the exception to a statute. This
anchoring should prevent the kind of case-by-case shift in
application epitomized by Ferguson III.
It would make the
exception more readily apparent to practitioners and judges and
would standardize its application.
When it enacted section 609.035 fifty years ago, the legislature
evinced an intent to not allow sentencing to be subject to the
whims of individual prosecutors or judges or to change
dramatically based upon how many charges a prosecutor files.
Codification and limitation of the multiple-victim exception to the
protections of section 609.035 would legitimately re-establish
legislative authority in this area, would protect the goals of section
609.035 by ensuring that sentences are based upon the defendant’s
conduct rather than the number of charges filed, and would serve
Minnesota’s laudable goal of maintaining a rational and
predictable sentencing system.
V. CONCLUSION
Sentencing in Minnesota is motived by two equally important
concerns: that defendants should receive a sentence commensurate
with their criminal conduct and that similar defendants who
commit similar crimes should receive similar sentences. Section
609.035 serves both of these goals. The court-created multiplevictim exception to the one-sentence rule of section 609.035 does
where defendant is convicted of several offenses against multiple victims during a
single behavioral incident, the court may impose multiple sentences and an
upward durational departure if facts show the defendant committed the crime in a
particularly serious way); State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 834 (Minn. 1987)
(upward-departure sentence justified where defendant fired two shots into a bar,
killing one person and “put[ting] a number of people at risk and in fear”).
165. See Edwards, 774 N.W.2d at 606–07 n.10; see also MINN. STAT. § 244.10,
subdiv. 5a(b) (2012) (providing that, notwithstanding section 609.035, a court
may impose an aggravated sentence based upon any aggravating factor which
occurs during the same course of conduct as the to-be-sentenced offense).
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not. Accordingly, the Minnesota legislature should amend section
609.035 and create a multiple-victim exception which is simple,
easy to apply, will lead to sentences proportionate with criminal
conduct, and will ensure that similarly situated criminal defendants
are treated similarly. By acting in this manner, the legislature will
ensure that Minnesota’s sentencing system will continue to
produce just results in future cases.
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